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Abstract
Introduction
Financial incentives are utilised in healthcare systems in a number of countries to improve
quality of care delivered to patients by rewarding practices or practitioners for achieving set
targets.
Objectives
To systematically review the evidence investigating the impact of financial incentives for
implementation of supported self-management on quality of care including: organisational
process outcomes, individual behavioural outcomes, and health outcomes for individuals
with asthma or diabetes; both conditions with an extensive evidence base for self-
management.
Methods
We followed Cochrane methodology, using a PICOS search strategy to search eight data-
bases in November 2015 (updated May 2017) including a broad range of implementation
methodologies. Studies were weighted by robustness of methodology, number of partici-
pants and the quality score. We used narrative synthesis due to heterogeneity of studies.
Results
We identified 2,541 articles; 12 met our inclusion criteria. The articles were from the US (n =
7), UK (n = 4) and Canada (n = 1). Measured outcomes were HbA1c tests undertaken and/
or the level achieved (n = 10), written action plans for asthma (n = 1) and hospital/emer-
gency department visits (n = 1). Three of the studies were part of a larger incentive scheme
including many conditions; one focused on asthma; eight focussed on diabetes. In asthma,
the proportion receiving ‘perfect care’ (including providing a written action plan) increased
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from 4% to 88% in one study, and there were fewer hospitalisations/emergency department
visits in another study. Across the diabetes studies, quality-of-care/GP performance scores
improved in three, were unchanged in six and deteriorated in one.
Conclusions
Results for the impact of financial incentives for the implementation of self-management
were mixed. The evidence in diabetes suggests no consistent impact on diabetic control.
There was evidence from a single study of improved process and health outcomes in
asthma. Further research is needed to confirm these findings and understand the process
by which financial incentives may impact (or not) on care.
Trial registration
Protocol registration number: CRD42016027411
Introduction
The prevalence of long term conditions is increasing and supported self-management is a
strategy to enable healthcare services to cope with this increase [1]. Self-management has been
defined as ‘the tasks that individuals must undertake to live with one or more chronic condi-
tions. These tasks include having the confidence to deal with medical management, role man-
agement and emotional management of their conditions’ [2]. A core responsibility of
professionals and healthcare organisations is to provide support to enable people with long-
term conditions to manage their own condition [3]. Asthma and diabetes are two long-term
conditions with a robust evidence base for supported self-management [4, 5].
Asthma and diabetes in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom (UK), 3.6 million people are being treated for clinician-diagnosed
asthma, costing £1.1 billion annually in healthcare resources [6]; globally up to 334 million
people are affected [7]. Supported self-management, including education and personalised
asthma action plans (PAAPs) have consistently been shown to improve asthma control, mini-
mise exacerbations and reduce emergency use of healthcare resources [5, 8–10]. The British
Guideline on the Management of Asthma recommends that all individuals with asthma should
be provided with self-management education and offered a PAAP [11]. However, ownership
of PAAPs remains low with only 24% of people with asthma in the UK reporting that they are
in possession of a PAAP [12].
There are 3.5 million people in the UK who have been diagnosed with diabetes and approx-
imately 1.1 million are as yet undiagnosed [13]. Self-management of diabetes, including life-
style changes, adherence to medication, monitoring blood sugars and adjusting dosages
accordingly can greatly improve quality of life. However, only 16% of individuals with diabetes
were offered an education course when first diagnosed [14]. In the UK GPs are incentivised
through the Quality Outcome Framework (QOF) to provide eight routine checks, as recom-
mended by National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, to individuals with diabetes [15]
but just 43.3% of individuals with Type 1 diabetes were receiving all eight of the recommended
care processes in 2010–11 and this has further dropped to 36.5% in 2015–16 [16].
Financial incentives and asthma or diabetes self-management
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Financial incentive schemes
Physician focussed financial incentive schemes are a potential strategy for changing physician
behaviour to improve quality of care which has recently been employed in national and local
schemes [15, 17]. Financial incentives which place the physician at financial risk have been
found to modify resource use (measured by hospitalisation rates and primary care visits) but
the evidence investigating the impact of bonus payments shows mixed results in terms of
impact [18]. Pay-for-performance can be effective in healthcare but providers should be
involved with programme design and schemes need to be tailored to the setting [19] and
patient population [20]. Incentives need to be tied to improvements in information systems
and quality reporting standards [21]. Policy makers must remain aware of unintended conse-
quences and carefully weigh potential benefits against the risks for their individual setting [22].
For example, general practitioners (GPs) interviewed about QOF highlighted the potential for
reduced continuity of care, lack of attention to non-incentivised conditions and potential dam-
age to healthcare professional’s internal motivation [23].
There is therefore uncertainty about the appropriate models employed in financial incen-
tive schemes and inconclusive insufficient evidence of their impact on quality of care [24].
This paper reports the findings of a systematic review describing the features of financial
incentive schemes promoting supported self-management, and evaluating the impact of the
schemes on quality of care, specifically organisational process outcomes, individual beha-
vioural outcomes, and health outcomes.
Methods
Our protocol is available on PROSPERO, registration number: CRD42016027411 (S1 Appen-
dix), and we followed the procedures described in the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic
Reviews of Interventions [25]. The searches were run in November 2015 and updated in May
2017.
Search strategy
Our PICOS search strategy is shown in Table 1. We searched eight databases: Cochrane Cen-
tral Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL); Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews
(CDSR); MEDLINE; PsychInfo; CINAHL; ScienceDirect; Web of Science; Embase. We
searched for asthma OR diabetes AND financial incentives AND self-management keywords
(S2 Appendix gives a detailed search strategy) and did not restrict the date range. The bibliog-
raphies of all eligible studies were examined to identify potential studies for inclusion and we
searched registries for studies in progress.
Study selection
One reviewer (TJ) conducted the searches in November 2015 and May 2017, 2,541 articles
were identified (Fig 1). Two reviewers (TJ and HP) screened a random selection of 100 papers,
compared and discussed decisions in order to reach agreement on the application of the inclu-
sion/exclusion criteria. After this training process, one reviewer (TJ) screened the remaining
titles and abstracts for potentially relevant papers. Full text screening was undertaken by two
reviewers (TJ and CYH) independently. Uncertainties and disagreements were resolved in dis-
cussion with a third reviewer (HP). Reviewers achieved 100% agreement with articles selected
for inclusion.
Financial incentives and asthma or diabetes self-management
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Quality assessment
It was anticipated that most of the studies included would be reporting implementation stud-
ies, therefore we did not apply any methodological filters. In order to weight the papers which
we expected would include a diverse range of methodologies, we adopted the approach of Pin-
nock 2015 [4] and papers were classified by robustness of study design, number of participants
and the quality score (using Downs’ and Black checklist [26]).
Outcomes
We defined our outcomes of interest in three categories:
1. Organisational process outcomes. Specific examples are ownership of a personalised asthma
action plan; attendance at patient training self-management courses for asthma or diabetes;
attendance at reviews providing supported self-management of asthma or diabetes.
2. Individual behavioural outcomes. Examples include self-efficacy, activation, adherence to
preventer medication, adherence to insulin regimes.
3. Health outcomes. Examples are symptom control, reducing asthma exacerbations, unsched-
uled care or use of emergency health services, and measuring glycaemic control for people
with diabetes (glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) levels reflect the overall glycaemic exposure
over the previous 2–3 months) [27].
Data extraction
Data were extracted from included papers by two reviewers (TJ and CJP) using a previously
piloted customised version of the Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Good
Practice data extraction form [28]. The extracted data were then compared and disagreements
resolved by discussion. We extracted details about the interventions under the following
Table 1. PICOS search strategy.
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION, INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA
POPULATION • Healthcare professionals incentivised (or whose organisation is incentivised) to provide
self-management
• Individuals with asthma or diabetes receiving care from an organisation which is
receiving financial incentives
INTERVENTION • Any financial incentive provided to a healthcare organisation and/or healthcare
professionals that is designed to improve supported self-management in asthma or
diabetes
COMPARISON • Healthcare professionals not incentivised (or whose organisation is not incentivised) to
provide self-management.
• Individuals with asthma or diabetes who are receiving usual, non-incentivised care
OUTCOMES • Organisational process: increase in quality of care, PAAP ownership and/or asthma/
diabetes reviews
• Disease control: decrease in exacerbations and/or hospitalisations, improved asthma/
diabetes control
• Individual behaviour: self-efficacy, activation, adherence to medication
SETTING • Any healthcare setting
STUDY
DESIGN
• Randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
• Quasi -RCTs
• Controlled before and after studies
• Interrupted time series
• Repeated measures
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478.t001
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Fig 1. Prisma 2009 flow diagram.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478.g001
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headings: “setting”, “risk of bias assessment”, “participants”,”intervention groups” “methods”,
“outcomes” and “results”.
Linked papers of the included studies were checked for descriptions of interventions, nested
qualitative studies, and process evaluations in order to supplement the information available
and to provide context. All authors were contacted to ask if any follow up work had been con-
ducted on their study and if they had any data available that were not included in the system-
atic review.
Analysis and synthesis
We anticipated substantial heterogeneity in study design and intervention [29]; meta-analysis
was therefore not appropriate and a narrative synthesis was undertaken. Asthma and diabetes
papers were analysed separately. We classified components of the interventions (e.g. whether
the financial incentive was paid to the individual (self-employed) healthcare professional or to
an organisation); whether payment was for achieving process standards (e.g. attendance at a
diabetes course) or health outcomes (e.g. reduced unscheduled care). A matrix of interventions
was developed with the interventions being shown to be effective or ineffective under the head-
ings of: “organisational process”; “measure of disease control” and “individual behaviour”. We
used Adams’ 2013 framework, which has been specifically designed for documenting financial
incentive interventions [30]. The framework contains nine domains which we used to identify
the features and describe the schemes in detail. These domains are: direction (positive reward
or avoidance of penalty), form (cash or healthcare costs), magnitude (total value of incentive
available to participant), certainty (certainty of receiving payment if behaviour is successfully
changed: certain, certain chance or uncertain chance), target behaviour (process, intermediate
or outcome), frequency of reward (all or some instances incentivised), immediacy (time
between behaviour and payment), schedule (fixed or variable), and recipient(s) of incentives
(clinicians).
We synthesised our results in the form of Harvest Plots, as they are a useful method for
illustrating the different effects of interventions because they represent all relevant data in one
plot [31]. In a Harvest plot, each bar represents an individual study, the bar colour indicates
the study design, the bar height reflects the number of participants in the study and the num-
ber reflects the Downs and Black quality score.
Results
From the 2,541 papers found, 12 papers were eligible for the systematic review (Fig 1 is the
PRISMA diagram with details of the selection process).
Study characteristics
The 12 papers were published between 2004–2017, seven were conducted in the United States
of America [32–38], four in the UK [39–42] and one in Canada [43]. One study reported on
an asthma-only scheme [36], three focused on diabetes-only schemes [32, 33, 43] and the
remaining eight looked at diabetes within a multiple condition scheme [34, 35, 37–42].
Risk of bias of included studies
There were problems with allocation concealment, selection bias, purposive sampling, random
sequence generation and selective outcome reporting in the selected studies. We used Review
Manager 5.3 to record and generate the risk of bias summary figure for the included studies
(S1 Fig). Beck’s [32] participants had volunteered to take part in the intensive case
Financial incentives and asthma or diabetes self-management
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management programme and the control group were those who had chosen not to, creating a
non-randomised, biased sample biased by willingness to participate. Conrad’s [34] participat-
ing group were selected by the Health Insurer, Fagan’s [35] participants were selected by the
managed care organisation as they had a “leadership which was willing to champion the pro-
posed quality improvement initiative” and Gulliford’s [39] participants were a self-selected
group that agreed to participate in an evaluation of diabetes care. Due to the nature of financial
incentive schemes, participant blinding is not an option so that allocation concealment was an
important source of bias.
Study quality and weight of evidence
The study designs varied (Fig 2) and included: five quasi-experimental [32–35, 37]; three inter-
rupted time series [38, 40, 42]; two longitudinal [39, 43]; one repeated measures [36] and one
controlled before and after study [41].
The quality scores ranged from 10 to 18 (Table 2). In common with other reviews assessing
the quality of implementation studies [44], we observed that some questions in the Downs’
and Black checklist [26] were not applicable to studies involving financial incentives. For
example, blinding of participants is not relevant in schemes which rely on publicity to promote
financial incentives awarded for achieving pre-set targets. Similarly, questions regarding the
randomisation process were not applicable to many of the quasi-experimental studies.
The size of the studies, in terms of patients, varied widely from 16 children admitted to hos-
pital with an episode of diabetic ketoacidosis who elected to participate in the scheme [32] to
1,174,294 patients with diabetes whose health insurance company, PacifiCare, trialled a pay-
Fig 2. Hierarchy of included studies. Hierarchy based on: randomisation and status of comparator groups; prospective/retrospective design. These
categories overlap and other factors will influence the robustness of the evidence (adapted for this review from Pinnock 2015 [4]).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478.g002
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Table 2. Characteristics of included studies.
Author, date,
country, LTC,
intervention
length
Design, participants
and quality
Intervention (domains of
financial incentives
framework*)
Recipient = clinician for all
studies
Comparison group Results
(all statistics details given where
available)
Impact
Beck (2004)
USA
Diabetes
1–15 months
Quasi-experimental.
1 hospital, 16 paediatric
patients who had an
incident of diabetic
ketoacidosis.
Quality score = 15
Pediatric Diabetes Intensive
Case Management
• Direction: avoidance of penalty
• Form: healthcare costs
• Magnitude: variable
• Chance: uncertain
• Target: process
• Frequency: all instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: unclear
• Schedule: variable
Participants who opted
out of intervention
Organisational process
Programme participation
• Participants greater telephone contact (16
crisis management calls vs 0; p = 0.001)
Disease control
Hospital admissions
• Decrease in hospital admissions from
intervention group (1 emergency
department visit or diabetic ketoacidosis
episode vs 5 diabetic ketoacidosis
hospitalisations; p = 0.039)
Positive for all
outcomes
Chien (2012)
USA
Diabetes
5 years
Quasi-experimental.
118 practices, 5557
patients with diabetes
Quality score = 13
Hudson Health Plan P4P
program
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: % of fee schedule
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: all instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: fixed
Medicaid-focused
health plans within New
York
Organisational process
HBa1C testing
Intervention group
• HbA1c testing: 2003 = 84% & 2004 = 85%,
2006 = 86% & 2007 = 91%
Control Group
• HbA1c testing: 2003 = 83% & 2004 = 85%,
2006 = 86% & 2007 = 87%
Disease control
HbA1c levels
Intervention group
• HbA1c <9b: 2003 = 36% & 2004 = 35%,
2006 = NA & 2007 = 32%
Control group
• HbA1c <9b: 2003 = 43% & 2004 = 38%,
2006 = NA & 2007 = 33%
(The coefficient on intervention*post
(difference in difference) was reported as
not significant in these results, no p value
provided.)
No significant
effect on either
outcome
Conrad (2013)
USA
Diabetes
4 years
Quasi-experimental.
19 medical groups,
21,365 patients
Quality score = 10
Washington state P4P scheme
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: % of revenue
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
5 Medical groups not
part of the QSC or QIP
(not randomised)
Organisational process
HbA1c testing
Quality Incentive Programme
• regression results: 2003–04 = -0.001 &
2005–07 = -0.04
Quality scorecard
• regression results: 2003–04 = -0.019 &
2005–07 = -0.004
Negative
Fagan (2010)
USA
Diabetes
12 months
Quasi-experimental.
20,943 65+ year old
patients.
Quality score = 16
Chronic care improvement
initiative consisting of P4P
practice-based care co-
ordination
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: % of capitation fee
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
No financial incentive
but retained a call
centre disease
management program
Organisational process
HbA1c testing
• Intervention Group–Odds ratio = 1.66; 95%
CI (1.14, 2.43)
• Comparison Group–Odds ratio = 3.76;
95%CI (3.42, 4.13)
• Intervention relative to Comparison–Odds
ratio = 0.44; 95%CI (0.30, 0.65)
No effect
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Author, date,
country, LTC,
intervention
length
Design, participants
and quality
Intervention (domains of
financial incentives
framework*)
Recipient = clinician for all
studies
Comparison group Results
(all statistics details given where
available)
Impact
Gulliford (2007)
UK
Diabetes
12 months
Longitudinal.
26 general practices,
2099 patients.
Quality score = 17
Quality Outcome Framework
(QOF)
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: Set £ value per
point
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
Pre QOF Organisational process
HbA1c testing
• HbA1c recorded in year (mean): 2000 = 60,
2001 = 72, 2002 = 80, 2003 = 78, 2005 = 95
Disease control
HbA1c levels
• HbA1c 7.4% (mean): 2000 = 22,
2001 = 32, 2002 = 37, 2003 = 38, 2005 = 57
• HbA1c 10% (mean): 2000 = 52,
2001 = 64, 2002 = 70, 2003 = 72, 2005 = 89
(No further statistics provided on these
outcomes)
Positive for both
outcomes
Kontopantelis
(2012)
UK
Diabetes
6 years
Interrupted time series.
148 practices, 23,920
patients.
Quality score = 17
Quality Outcome Framework
(QOF)
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: Set £ value per
point
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
Pre QOF Organisational process
HbA1c testing
• HbA1c recorded in year (SD): 2000/
1 = 71.1 (45.3), 2001/2 = 77.9 (41.5), 2002/
3 = 82.8 (37.7), 2003/4 = 89.2 (31.1), 2004/
5 = 93.0 (25.5), 2005/6 = 93.7 (24.3), 2006/
7 = 93.5 (24.6)
Disease control
HbA1c levels
• HbA1c 7.4% (SD): 2000/1 = 45.5 (49.8),
2001/2 = 48.4 (50.0), 2002/3 = 50.2 (50.0),
2003/4 = 52.2 (50.0), 2004/5 = 55.6 (49.7),
2005/6 = 56.4 (49.6), 2006/7 = 59.3 (49.1)
• HbA1c 10% (SD): 2000/1 = 88.5 (31.9),
2001/2 = 90.4 (29.4), 2002/3 = 90.8 (28.9),
2003/4 = 91.8 (27.4), 2004/5 = 92.6 (26.3),
2005/6 = 92.5 (26.3), 2006/7 = 92.7 (26.0)
Positive for both
outcomes
LeBlanc
(2017)
Canada
Diabetes
10 years
Longitudinal.
583 physicians, 83,580
adult patients
Quality score = 13
New Brunswick P4P Scheme
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: set $ value per
patient
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: all instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: ongoing
• Schedule: fixed
Pre-incentive scheme Organisational Process
HbA1c testing
• 2 HbA1c tests per year: univariate model
OR = 1.16 (p<0.0001); 99%CI (1.11 1.20).
Multivariate model OR = 1.23 (p<0.0001);
99%CI (1.18, 1.28)
Disease control
HbA1c levels
• All patients: univariate model OR = 0.00;
99%CI (-0.03, 0.02). Multivariate model OR
= -0.01; 99%CI (-0.03, 0.02
• HbA1C 6.5% to 7.0%: univariate model OR
= -0.02 (p<0.0001); 99%CI (-0.04, 0.01).
Multivariate model OR = -0.02 (p<0.0001);
99%CI (-0.04, 0.01).
• HbA1C 7.1% to 8.9%: univariate model
OR = 0.03; 99%CI (-0.01, 0.08).
Multivariate model OR = 0.02; 99%CI (-0.02,
0.06).
• HbA1C 9%: univariate model OR = 0.04;
99%CI (-0.06, 0.15).Multivariate model
OR = 0.00; 99%CI (-0.10, 0.10)
Positive
organisational
process
No effect for
disease control
Mandel (2007)
USA
Asthma
26 months
Repeated measures.
44 paediatric practices
13 380 children.
Quality score = 16
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital
Medical Center asthma
improvement collaborative
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: % of fee schedule
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: unclear
• Schedule: variable
Pre-incentive scheme Organisational process
Asthma action plan ownership.
• 19 (70%) achieved the 80% threshold for
the PAAP.
The cumulative percentage of the network
all-payer asthma population receiving
“perfect care” increased from 4% to 88%,
with 18 of 44 practices (41%) achieving a
perfect care percentage of 95% or greater
(no statistics reported)
Positive
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Author, date,
country, LTC,
intervention
length
Design, participants
and quality
Intervention (domains of
financial incentives
framework*)
Recipient = clinician for all
studies
Comparison group Results
(all statistics details given where
available)
Impact
Pape (2015)
UK
Diabetes
1 year
Before and after study.
1 primary care trust,
6,142 patients.
Quality score = 18
Quality Outcome Framework
"stretch" scheme (QOF+)
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: Set £ value per
point
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
Pre QOF+ Disease control
HbA1c levels
HbA1c of 8%:
• Exception reporting Baseline = 0.085,
Secular trend effect = 0.001 (p = 0.910),
QOF+ baseline = 0.060 (p = 0.018)
• Controlled Patients Baseline = 0.725,
Secular trend effect = 0.015 (p = 0.005),
QOF+ baseline = 0.002 (p = 0.968)
HbA1c of 9%:
• Exception reporting Baseline = 0.062,
Secular trend effect = 0.001 (p = 0.891),
QOF+ baseline = 0.043 (p = 0.049)
• Controlled Patients Baseline = 0.822,
Secular trend effect = 0.015 (p = 0.002),
QOF+ baseline = 0.003 (p = 0.934)
No effect
Rosenthal (2005)
USA
Diabetes
1 year
Quasi-experimental.
205 physician groups,
1,174,294 patients.
Quality score = 18
PacifiCare P4P program
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: set $ value per
patient once target met
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: quarterly
• Schedule: fixed
Same performance
figures but no financial
incentives
Organisational process
HbA1c testing
Intervention group
• Pre Quality Incentive Programme—62.0%,
after QIP 64.1%,
• Difference (Post-pre), 2.1% (SE 1.0)
• P value .02
Control group
• Pre Quality Incentive Programme—62.0%,
after QIP 64.1%,
• Difference (Post-pre), 2.1% (SE 1.0)
• P value .02
No effect
Vamos (2011)
UK
Diabetes
1 year
Interrupted time series.
422 general practices
154 945 patients.
Quality score = 15
Quality Outcome Framework
(QOF)
• Direction: positive reward
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: Set £ value per
point
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
Pre-QOF Organisational process
HbA1c measured
• HbA1c measured (95% CI)- 1997, by
quintile: 32.8 (31.8–33.7), 31.2 (30.2–32.0),
34.6 (33.7–35.6), 32.2 (31.2–33.0), 37.7
(36.7–38.7)
• HbA1c measured (95% CI)- 2005, by
quintile: 74.0 (73.4–74.6), 76.4 (75.8–76.9),
77.3 (76.7–77.8), 73.9 (73.3–74.5), 76.2
(75.6–76.8)
Disease control
HbA1c mean levels
• HbA1c mean (95% CI)- 1997, by quintile,
7.6 (7.5–7.7), 7.6 (7.5–7.7), 7.7 (7.6–7.8),
7.5 (7.4–7.6), 8.2 (8.1–8.3)
• HbA1c mean (95% CI)- 2005, by quintile,
7.5 (7.5–7.5), 7.4 (7.4–7.4), 7.4 (7.4–7.4),
7.5 (7.4–7.5), 7.4 (7.4–7.5)
• Baseline proportion of patients meeting
HbA1c <7.0% in 1997: 35.3, 95% CI = 31.0–
39.7, p<0.05
• Annual change before introduction of P4P:
2.0,95% CI = 1.3–2.7, p<0.05
• Annual change in the year P$P introduced:
0.8, 95% CI = -1.8–3.5,
• Annual change after P4P was introduced:
-2.2, 95% CI = -4.0- -0.4, p<0.01
No effect
(Continued)
Financial incentives and asthma or diabetes self-management
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478 November 6, 2017 10 / 20
for-performance scheme in their California medical groups and compared results to their
medical practices in Oregon and Washington [37]. In these cluster randomised implementa-
tion studies, the total number of eligible patients was not always clear. We contacted three
authors: two were able to confirm patient numbers [37, 41] and one was not [38]. However,
from the number of physicians in this latter study we were able to estimate the number of
patients.
The overall weightings [4] which reflect the robustness of the study design (Fig 2), number
of participants and quality score are summarised in Table 2.
Features of the financial incentive schemes
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the studies; the key features of the schemes mapped to
the financial incentive framework for documenting financial incentive interventions to change
health behaviours [30] are listed in the “Intervention” column. The studies are described
below using the domains of this framework.
Direction and form. One scheme used avoidance of penalty [32], ten studies used positive
rewards [33–37, 39–43] and one study used a mixture of avoidance of penalty and positive
rewards [38] as the reward component of the incentive scheme. One study looked at a reim-
bursement scheme in which the insurance company refunded practices for preventative self-
management education costs [30], the remaining eleven schemes were cash incentives paid to
the clinicians or practice for achieving targets [33–43].
Magnitude and certainty. One study looked at a scheme which paid a financial incentive
for each HbA1c test that was completed [33]. One study described a scheme which involved
receiving a payment for each performance target met or exceeded [37]. One study described a
scheme where physicians were paid a set amount per patient that received two HbA1c tests per
year [43]. Eight studies looked at a target achievement scheme where there were pre-set “per-
centage of patients” targets that physicians had to achieve in order to receive the financial
Table 2. (Continued)
Author, date,
country, LTC,
intervention
length
Design, participants
and quality
Intervention (domains of
financial incentives
framework*)
Recipient = clinician for all
studies
Comparison group Results
(all statistics details given where
available)
Impact
Young (2007)
USA
Diabetes
2 years
Interrupted time series.
334 Primary care
physicians, unknown
number of patients.
Quality score = 16
Rochester (New York) Individual
Practice Association P4P
program
• Direction: positive reward %
avoidance of penalty
• Form: cash
• Magnitude: % of incentive pool
comprised of % of physician fees
• Chance: certain
• Target: process
• Frequency: some instances
incentivised
• Immediacy: annually
• Schedule: variable
Pre-incentive scheme Organisational process
HbA1c testing
• Adherence rates: mean (SD) pre-
intervention: 1999 = 0.56 (0.23), 2000 = 0.57
(0.19), 2001 = 0.59 (0.17)
• Adherence rates: mean (SD) post-
intervention: 2002 = 0.62 (0.17), 2003 = 0.61
(0.18), 2004 = 0.63 (0.18)
• Change in adherence rate: 2000–
2001 = 0.018; 2001–2002 = 0.026, p<0.05
• Difference in rate of change (2001–2000)
(vs (2002–2004) = 0.009 (no p value given)
No effect
P4P = Pay for performance HbA1C = glycated haemoglobin
*Financial incentive framework (1) consists of 9 domains: Direction- whether the reward is positive gain or avoidance of negative penalty; Form-
nature of incentive e.g. cash, vouchers etc.; Magnitude–value of incentive available to participant; Certainty- likelihood of receiving incentive if behaviour
changes; Target- type of behaviour being targeted; Frequency- number of instances of behaviour that are incentivised; Immediacy- how soon after the
behaviour the incentive is provided; Schedule- whether the incentive amount its fixed or variable; Recipient- who is in receipt of incentives
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478.t002
Financial incentives and asthma or diabetes self-management
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478 November 6, 2017 11 / 20
incentive [34–36, 38–42] and ten studies had ‘certain’ incentives if practices successfully
achieved targets [33, 35–43]. One scheme had an ‘uncertain’ chance of receiving the financial
incentive if they changed their behaviour at the start of the scheme (years 2003–2004) as the
payments were only paid to top scoring groups [34]. In the second phase of the scheme (years
2005–2007) this was altered and all groups had a certain chance of receiving a payment if they
changed their behaviour. Beck’s 2004 [32] study of children with diabetes in Oklahoma had an
uncertain chance of receiving a return on the amount spent on the incentive case management
scheme, it depended on whether, and how many times, the participant was rehospitalised.
Target and frequency. All schemes [30–43] focussed on “process” behaviours, these are
clinician actions that are likely to improve health outcomes. All of the studies included in this
review were assessing the impact of financial incentives on clinician behaviour. There were
four studies that focussed on a single condition, asthma or diabetes [32, 33, 36, 43]. Three of
which reported a positive impact on supported self-management behaviour: Beck 2004 [32]
(quasi-experimental, 1 hospital, 16 children, D&B = 15); LeBlanc 2017 [43] (longitudinal, 583
physicians, 83,580 adult patients, D&B = 13) and Mandel 2007 [36] (repeated measures, 44
practices, 13,380 children, D&B = 16). The final study, Chien 2012 [33] (quasi-experimental,
118 practices, 5,557 participants, D&B = 13), showed no effect. The rest of the studies looked
at multiple condition schemes which included diabetes and reported a mixture of positive
results [39, 40], no effect [35, 37, 38, 41, 42] and a negative outcome was reported by Conrad
2013 [34] (quasi-experimental, 19 medical groups, 21, 365 patients, D&B = 10). Two schemes
[32, 33] incentivised all instances of the behaviour and the remaining studies had some
instances incentivised as they had to reach percentage targets [34–42].
Immediacy and schedule. The financial incentive framework [30] defines immediacy as
how soon the recipient receives the incentive payment after the behaviour. If the time between
behaviour and reward is too long, recipients may not link the two and the incentive will fail to
be effective. Eight of the included schemes paid incentives on an annual basis [33–35, 38–42].
Two studies reported an explicit link between performance and payment; Rosenthal 2005 [37]
described a scheme which paid a quarterly bonus of $0.23 per member per month for each per-
formance target that was met or exceeded by the physician group and Chien 2012 [33] report-
ing practices receiving $100 for each patient for which missing care processes were completed.
It was unclear in the article by LeBlanc (2017) [43] when the physicians received the payment
for achieving the target of two HbA1c tests per year.
In the only asthma study included [36], the Cincinnati asthma improvement collaborative
comprised of three stages with two different payment phases: all awards were assessed on 31
December 2004 and first-level fee schedule increases implemented from 1 May 2004 through
to 31 December 2005; second and third-level fee schedule increases effective from 1 March
2005, through to 31 December 2005.
Beck 2003 [32] developed a 15-month scheme with a less tangible reward of reduced health-
care costs where they calculated financial impact of participation in the programme versus the
healthcare costs per participant and non-participant.
Recipients. Although all studies looked at a financial incentive paid to either the clinician
or the practice, the papers differed in the way in which they reported numbers of study partici-
pants: nine articles noted number of patients [32–35, 39, 40, 42, 43]; seven referred to the num-
ber of practices/medical groups [33–37, 39, 40, 42, 43]; one study discussed a primary care
trust (administrative body responsible for primary healthcare services in England) [41] and
one discussed number of physicians [38]. Fagan [35] described an intervention for individuals
with diabetes aged 65 years plus, two studies focussed on a targeted population of children [32,
36] and Chien 2012 [33] evaluated the impact of a scheme where lower socio-economic popu-
lations were targeted.
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Impact of the schemes on process, behavioural and health outcomes
Table 2 summarizes the key findings from each of the studies and Fig 3 illustrates our synthesis
with supporting information in S1 Table.
Organisational process. One study described an asthma improvement collaborative in
Cincinnati [36] (repeated measures, 44 practices, 13,380 children, D&B = 16) which consists of
a three level reward system. Practices had to reach a set target in each level in order to be eligi-
ble to proceed to the next level. Written action plans for patients with asthma were part of the
criteria for the third level of the reward system. Authors concluded that the asthma pay-for-
performance scheme had a positive impact on the proportion of patients with asthma receiving
“perfect care” which increased from 4% before the intervention to 88% after. “Perfect care”
was assessed on performance of components including: provision of a written action plan; pro-
vision of controller medication (if required); and recording patients’ control based on National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute guideline recommended classification.
Nine studies reported proportion of patients who received HbA1c tests [33–35, 37–40, 42,
43]. Six reported that the financial incentive scheme had no effect [33, 35, 37, 38, 42], three
reported that financial incentives had a positive effect on increasing frequency of HbA1c test-
ing [39, 40, 43] and one study reported negative impact on the number of HbA1C tests per-
formed [34]. Fagan 2010 [35] (Quasi-experimental, 20,943 65+ year old patients, D&B = 16)
found that although the intervention group improved, it did not improve as much as the com-
parison group; the authors concluded that the study did not generate significant evidence to
support a pay for performance scheme.
Fig 3. Harvest plot. Illustrating the impact of financial incentives schemes on organisational process and disease control outcomes. Notes: Each bar
represents an individual study. The colour of the bar indicates the study design, the height of the bar reflect the number of participants in the study and the
number is the Downs and Black quality score. The decisions that underpin this plot are detailed in S1 Table.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187478.g003
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Chien [33] (quasi-experimental, 118 practices, 5,557 participants, D&B = 13) found no sta-
tistically significant improvement in patterns of care or clinical outcomes. They identified that
younger adults and those with more comorbidities were less likely to receive recommended
care and experienced a diabetes-related emergency department visit more often. However, two
studies noted that practices in lower socio-economic status areas require additional support to
overcome barriers [37, 39].
Disease control. Six studies reported on test results for HbA1c levels [33, 39–43], with
four studies reporting no effect [33, 41, 42] and two reporting a positive effect [39, 40]. One
study evaluated an intensive case management scheme offered to 16 children who had been
hospitalised after an incident of diabetic ketoacidosis [32]. They reported that participation in
the intensive program was associated with fewer hospitalisations resulting in lower costs for
participants ($1063 per individual) than non-participants ($2396 per individual).
Individual behavior. None of the studies reported on self-efficacy, activation or adher-
ence to medication which we had classified as “individual behaviour”.
Discussion
Statement of principal findings
A total of 12 papers (three diabetes; one asthma; eight multiple condition schemes including
diabetes but not asthma) reporting on self-management interventions met the inclusion crite-
ria and were included in the review. The impact of financial incentives paid to healthcare pro-
fessionals for implementing self-management to patients with asthma or diabetes is
inconsistent. Although most showed no effect [33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43] or a positive impact
[32, 36, 39, 40, 43] on organisational process or disease control outcomes, one study targeting
organisational processes showed a negative effect on the proportion of people with HbA1c
testing [34]. We found no articles which analysed the impact of financial incentives on individ-
ual behaviour outcomes.
Interpretation of findings in relation to previously published work
The schemes targeted a range of organisational and health outcomes including: programme
participation, asthma action plan ownership, HbA1c testing, HbA1C level testing and hospita-
lisations. However, we did not find any studies matching our inclusion criteria which looked
at individual behavioural outcomes, identifying a gap in the research literature. For the organi-
sational process outcomes five of the studies reported positive results [32, 36, 39, 40, 43], five
reported no statistically significant effect [33, 35, 37, 38, 42] and one reported that the financial
incentive scheme had a negative impact on results [34]. In the studies targeting disease control
outcomes; three reported positive effects [32, 39, 40] and four reported no effect [33, 41, 42,
43]. Effective implementation strategies involve a multifaceted approach accommodating
patient, professional and organisational aspects [5] but financial incentive schemes do not
incorporate all of these aspects. Typically, they focus on the professionals, the organisations, or
the patients separately but do not take a whole systems approach which proposes that all of
these aspects require inclusion for successful implementation.
The financial incentives schemes were diverse and incorporated features across all the
domains of the financial incentives framework (1). It was difficult to draw conclusions on
which type of scheme was the most effective in changing healthcare professionals’ behaviour
in relation to providing supported self-management to individuals with asthma or diabetes.
Four of the studies that reported no statistically significant effect noted that the magnitude of
the financial incentive might have contributed to the lack of effect [33–35, 37]. If the health
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care professional deems the size of the incentive potentially too modest for the effort and
money spent on achieving the target, they are unlikely to change their behaviour.
The one negative result is a reminder that providing financial incentives may have unin-
tended consequences and the implementation of financial incentive schemes must be
approached with caution. Previous work has identified the potential negative impact of finan-
cial incentives schemes and produced a checklist to prevent inappropriate implementation
[45]. Glazsiou’s checklist consists of nine questions and is divided into two parts “Part A: Is a
financial incentive appropriate?” and “Part B: Implementation”. All six questions in Part A
must be answered yes before continuing to considering implementation in Part B. One ques-
tion in the checklist addresses the potential for unintended consequences and specifically high-
lights harm to the patient-clinician relationship. They provide evidence from a report showing
that some UK clinicians became reluctant to register patients with complex poorly controlled
conditions that would make it difficult for them to achieve their QOF targets [46]. Within
QOF guidelines, practices are able to exclude patients from their reporting if the intervention
was considered inappropriate, or was declined by the patient. Two studies identified overuse
of ‘exception reporting’ as a strategy for potentially achieving more favourable results [39, 41].
Gulliford 2007 [39] raised concerns that an increase in ‘excepted’ cases was a potential reason
for high QOF achievements. Pape [41] found that with the introduction of QOF+ (a UK
scheme with more ambitious targets than the national QOF scheme), ‘exception reporting’
increased significantly in the indicators for HbA1c and concluded that financial incentives
schemes had no significant effect.
When applying the financial incentives framework [30] to schemes for clinicians, the ‘Recipi-
ent’ domain does not take into consideration the patient population and whether the scheme
was targeted at a specific population, for example lower socio-economic status was a population
identified by two authors as having barriers which require additional support [37, 39]. Glaz-
siou’s checklist for implementing a financial incentive scheme identifies the importance of
understanding and assessing potential barriers to changing clinician behaviours [45]. Evidence
has shown that while financial incentives have the potential to reduce the inequalities in
achievement related to area deprivation, differences do still exist [47], these must therefore be
considered when designing future financial incentives schemes aimed at clinician behaviour.
The number of conditions in the scheme, a domain not included in the financial incentives
framework [30], was not consistently associated with positive or negative findings and further
research is required into whether an incentive scheme focussing on a single condition rather
than multiple conditions would produce more positive results.
Strengths and limitations
The heterogeneity of methodologies used in studies investigating financial incentives paid to
health care professionals for providing self-management education to their patients with
asthma or diabetes made it difficult to compare studies. Therefore, we adopted the approach of
Pinnock 2015 [4] and classified papers by methodology robustness, number of participants
and quality score. A number of questions on the quality checklist employed in this review [26]
were not appropriate for the papers included which led to low quality scores. A recently pub-
lished quality checklist for reporting implementation studies may provide a framework better
able to assess the quality of implementation research [29].
All studies were conducted in either the United States of America, Canada or the UK which
limits the generalisability of the findings. Research looking at financial incentives aimed at
healthcare professionals uses self-reporting data which presumes that all information provided
is accurate and truthful.
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All the studies were nonrandomised studies which are inherently more biased than rando-
mised control trials [48], though the risk of bias in the included studies was assessed as low or
unclear in the majority of the studies. Selection bias, purposive sampling, and selective out-
come reporting were also identified in the selected studies.
We were unable to complete funnel plots to measure the extent of publication bias as we
conducted a narrative analysis not a meta-analysis due to the heterogeneity of the study
designs. However, the results of the included studies were a mixture of positive, no effect and
negative on health and process outcomes in self-management of asthma or diabetes which sug-
gests that there was not a high percentage of publication bias [49].
Time and resource constraints meant that the initial screening of title and abstracts was
conducted by a single reviewer. However, training and quality assessment were undertaken on
5% of title/abstracts screened to reduce subjectivity and minimise potential inaccuracies. Full
text screening and data extraction was completed by two reviewers.
Implications for future research, clinical care and policy
The limited number of studies investigating the impact of financial incentives on the imple-
mentation of asthma or diabetes self-management identifies a gap in the literature where fur-
ther research is required. In particular, we only identified one study investigating the impact of
financial incentives on the implementation of asthma self-management [36]. There is a further
gap in research assessing the impact of financial incentives paid to healthcare professionals, on
behavioural outcomes such as self-efficacy, activation or adherence to medication; no studies
were identified in this area.
Further research is needed to confirm findings and understand the process by which finan-
cial incentives impact (or not) on care. Determinants of how financial incentives impact on
organisation of care and health outcomes are multifactorial and complex. Results from this
systematic review show that as well as money, there are other factors influencing healthcare
professionals’ behaviour in delivering self-management for asthma and diabetes. Smaller prac-
tices may lack the infrastructure that is required to improve quality of care [38] and practices
with a patient population of low socioeconomic status face barriers that make financial incen-
tives schemes less effective in these areas [37, 39]. The use of ‘exception reporting’ for individu-
als who do not meet QOF (or other financial incentives scheme’s) guidelines needs to be
monitored to ensure that individuals who require specialised, complex or more critical care
are not being overlooked. When producing incentive schemes designers need to consider: the
existing infrastructure in the organisation; target populations; the size of the incentive and
time; effort and resources required to implement change; as well as unintended consequences.
Conclusion
The evidence provided in this systematic review showed mixed results for whether financial
incentives have an impact on behaviour change in healthcare professionals to provide self-
management to individuals with asthma or diabetes. Due to the diversity of the schemes, it is
difficult to draw conclusions on what aspects of the incentives are most effective. However,
size of financial incentives, exception reporting and socio-economic status of patient popula-
tion were all reported as being influential. The number of conditions in an incentive scheme,
i.e. targeted on one condition or multiple condition scheme, was not associated with the suc-
cess of the scheme. Further research is required in order to understand the complex nature of
behaviour changing interventions on healthcare professionals in relation to increasing self-
management in individuals with asthma or diabetes.
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